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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
NATIONAL ESTIMATES BOARD

10 August 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, OIR  
Colonel B. D. Talley, G-2  
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI  
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AFON  
Captain R. G. McCool, JIG

SUBJECT: NIE-41: Probable Developments in the Kashmir  
Dispute to the End of 1951

1. The enclosed terms of reference were agreed on by the IAC representatives meeting on 10 August 1951.

2. It is requested that contributions be received in this office by the close of business on Monday, 20 August from State, Navy, and Air Force. The Army contribution is requested by Thursday, 23 August.

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Executive Secretary

Distribution "B"

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

10 August 1951

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-41: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS  
IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE TO THE END OF 1951

(Revised text for IAC Representatives)

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Indian and Pakistani capabilities and intentions concerning Kashmir, and to indicate probable developments in the dispute during 1951, with particular reference to the possible use of armed force.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATUS OF KASHMIR?

Brief introductory section outlining the development of the dispute up through the designation of the Graham mission and the present upsurge of tension. It should note: (1) the military situation in Kashmir, including deployment of the respective forces; and (2) the position of the Abdullah and Asad Kashmir governments; and (3) the role of the UN and recent UN activity. Significant dates should be specified.

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II. WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN KASHMIR?

A. What are the roots of Indian interest in Kashmir?

1. Nationalism (including religious, historical,  
OIR and prestige factors) -- how important and en-  
during is this interest?
2. Economic: Is Kashmir important to the Indian  
OIR economy? How and to what degree? Could possession  
of Kashmir be used to bring economic pressure on  
Pakistan particularly through control of the water  
supply?
3. Military: what is the importance of Kashmir in  
G-2 relation to possible conflict with Pakistan? -- in  
relation to conflict with any other nation? Do  
military leaders of India attach importance to  
Kashmir?
4. What is the relation of the Kashmir issue to Indian  
OIR domestic politics?
5. What is the relative weight of these factors? Is  
OIR and there any particular urgency or a time factor  
G-2 attached to any one or to all?

B. What are the roots of Pakistani interest in Kashmir?

1. Nationalism (including religious, historical, and  
OIR prestige factors) -- how important and enduring  
is this interest?

- OIR            2. Economic: is Kashmir important to the Pakistani economy? How and to what degree?
- G-2            3. Military: what is the importance of Kashmir in relation to possible conflict with India? -- in relation to conflict with any other state? Do military leaders of Pakistan attach importance to Kashmir?
- OIR            4. What is the relation of the Kashmir issue to Pakistani domestic politics?
- OIR and G-2    5. What is the relative weight of these factors? Is there any particular urgency or a time factor attached to any one or to all?

- OIR and G-2    C. Could these interests in Kashmir be satisfied for either nation by anything short of total control of Kashmir? If so, to what extent? How geographically?

III. WHAT ARE INDIA'S CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE INTENTIONS?

- OIR and Defense    A. What are India's military capabilities in relation to:  
(1) all-out war against Pakistan; (2) limited action designed to secure all or a part of Kashmir without any invasion of present Pakistan or with only limited invasion. To what extent might India be aided or hindered by Afghan intervention in a conflict?

B. What are India's political capabilities:

1. Through continued cooperation with Abdullah including such projects as the approaching  
OIR Constituent Assembly elections? What are  
the likely results of these elections and what  
consequences would follow from these results?
2. Through UN action? Would Indian leaders believe  
OIR there was a possibility of a favorable turn in  
the UN?
3. Through collusion with Afghanistan? Could the  
OIR Indian leaders hope to use this to hamstring  
the Pakistani and continue the present status quo?

C. What intentions are indicated by recent Indian activities?

OIR and Defense Do Indian military moves and political statements  
indicate a desire to provoke war, a willingness to  
accept war, or the pursuit of political objectives  
through military pressure?

1. Is there any direct evidence of the purpose  
OIR and Defense of recent Indian activities?
2. Do Indian military moves constitute a complete  
Defense preparation for either a limited or all-out war?  
Would additional moves be necessary or likely  
before either could be undertaken?

Defense 3. Are there any special time or weather factors limiting Indian freedom of action?

OIR 4. What possible non-military object could the recent moves have?

D. From the Indian standpoint, what are the pros and cons of a deliberate resort to war by India?

1. Possible Pros:

G-2 a. Do the Indians believe that they might achieve a fairly easy victory which would cement their position in Kashmir and at the same time secure the border and release their forces?

OIR b. Do the Indians believe that nothing short of military force will achieve a lasting solution satisfactory to their interests, and that they cannot expect such a solution from political measures?

OIR c. Would a campaign against Pakistan, limited or all-out, have domestic political advantages for Nehru?

2. Possible Cons:

OIR a. Do the Indians regard the present status quo in Kashmir as satisfactory without the need for further action?

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b. Are the Indians uncertain of a quick and easy victory? If so, to what extent may they be deterred by possible destruction, cost, and economic burdens of a prolonged struggle?

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c. Are the Indians deterred by any prospect of renewed communal rioting within India as a result of war?

OIR

d. Are the Indians deterred by any prospect of Pakistani reaction elsewhere, such as expulsion of Hindus from Bengal or adverse trade measures?

OIR

e. Are the Indians deterred by possible adverse external reaction: e.g., (a) in the UN; (b) in Asia, (Burma, Indonesia, etc.); (c) in the Moslem world (affecting Iranian oil for example); (d) in the British Commonwealth nations, affecting India's ties in this quarter?

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f. Are the Indians deterred by any prospect that an armed conflict would greatly weaken the overall strength of the area in the face of the Soviet threat?

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3. Do the cons outweigh the pros? Is a deliberate resort to war by India likely?

OIR E. Might the Indian government be driven to war by popular clamor or by increased communal rioting and feeling within India? What are the prospects of such clamor and increased rioting? Is there any evidence of Communist activity designed to promote them (cf. the Tudeh party in Iran)?

OIR F. In the absence of full-scale hostilities, what non-military courses of action are the Indians likely to follow? What are the chances of increased cooperation with and promotion of the Abdullah regime? Of increased collusion with Afghanistan? Of any other new courses of action? Finally, what are the chances of Indian acquiescence in UN action?

IV. WHAT ARE PAKISTAN'S CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE INTENTIONS?

Defense A. What are Pakistan's military capabilities in relation to: (1) all-out war against India; (2) limited action designed to secure all or a part of Kashmir without any invasion of present India or with only limited such invasion? To what extent might Pakistan be aided or hindered by Afghan intervention in a conflict?



B. What are Pakistan's political capabilities:

- OIR 1. Through the UN? Are the Pakistani leaders confident of a favorable solution through the UN?
- OIR 2. Through enlistment of British Commonwealth or other support?

C. What are the indications from the Pakistani response

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and  
Defense

to India's activities? Do Pakistani military moves and political statements indicate a desire to provoke war, a willingness to accept war, or the pursuit of political objectives through military pressure?

Defense

1. Do Pakistani military moves indicate a state of complete readiness for war? Do troop dispositions indicate the possibility of action elsewhere than in Kashmir itself?

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2. Have Pakistani political statements been conciliatory or do they indicate a possible desire to put India in the wrong and accept war?

D. From the Pakistani standpoint, what are the pros and cons of a deliberate resort to war by Pakistan?

1. Possible pros:

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- a. Do the Pakistani leaders regard the present Kashmir situation as intolerable and any favorable UN solution as so remote or impossible as to be not worth waiting for?

b. Do the Pakistani leaders believe that, whatever their prospects in an all-out war, they might be able to achieve initial successes and then dig in and possibly accept a UN cease-fire?

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c. How strong are the domestic political pressures for war?

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2. Possible Cons:

a. Do the Pakistani leaders fear that a war would become one of attrition with heavy casualties and other burdens?

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b. Are the Pakistani leaders deterred by the exposed position of East Pakistan?

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c. Do the Pakistani leaders fear attack from Afghanistan in the event of war with India? (Or, on the contrary, might the Pakistani leaders expect that in the event of war with India the Pathan tribes might join with Pakistan and against Afghanistan, to Pakistan's long-term advantage?)

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d. Are the Pakistani sensitive to the fact that conflict would weaken the area in face of a Soviet threat?

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OIR                   e. Are the Pakistani leaders deterred by  
possible adverse world and British  
Commonwealth opinion?

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G-2                   3. Do the cons outweigh the pros? Is a deliberate  
resort to war by Pakistan likely?

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G-2                   E. Might the Pakistan government be driven to war by  
popular clamor, by border incidents, or even by the  
Pakistani army itself getting out of control and  
taking unauthorized hostile action? What are the  
chances of such events? Is there any evidence of  
Communist activity designed to promote them?

OIR                   F. In the absence of full-scale hostilities, what non-  
military courses of action are the Pakistani likely to  
follow? What moves might Pakistan make in the UN?  
Might Pakistan seek some other solution, such as a  
resort to arbitration or the International Court of  
Justice?

V.                   WHAT UN COURSES OF ACTION ARE LIKELY TO AFFECT THE SITUATION  
UP TO THE END OF 1951?

OIR                   What is the likely effect of the Graham mission? What other  
action might the UN take, either at the instigation of one

of the parties or of some third nation? What concrete action might the UN take in implementing any resolution?

VI. WHAT ARE THE PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEAR FUTURE ?

OIR and De-fense How might either India or Pakistan react to possible moves by the other or by the UN? What are the chances of a series of actions, individually less than a provocation to war, creating a situation in which war would become more likely? How might this happen? Conversely, what are the chances of a relaxation of tension? How might this happen?

VII. WHAT EFFECT COULD THESE PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE ON US SECURITY INTERESTS?

OIR and De-fense This section is intended to delineate, but not to give a detailed analysis of, the principal consequences of developments in the dispute, particularly actual hostilities, on US security interests. Attention might be given to the possible denial of strategic materials and/or bases to the US, and on a broader scale to the possible effect with regard to such points as (1) the maintenance of orderly government in India and Pakistan; (2) the survival of an independent Pakistan; (3) US-Pakistan and US-India relations; (4) defence of the

Middle East; (5) the position of Afghanistan; (6) Soviet and/or Chinese Communist efforts to exploit any of the above in order to improve their positions in South and Southeast Asia.